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**Choibalsan and Inner Mongolia:
What did Marshal Choibalsan Say
to the Political Mission from Inner Mongolia?**

ABSTRACT: Why is Inner Mongolia presently an ethnic (national) autonomous region (*minzu zizhiqu*) of China? In other words, when did Inner Mongolia become a part of China's territory? The Mongols did not observe the difference between "Inner" and "Outer". In order to achieve national unity and independence from China, the Mongols counted on Russia and Japan as potentially useful powers. But Inner Mongolia was handed over to China by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union according to secretly signed Yalta Agreement in February 1945. After the end of the Second World War, the Mongols strived for political unification. So how did the Mongols negotiate? What is the difference between the Mongolian historical experience and the Chinese records? And how did China see this history in the process of writing its own revolutionary history? This paper demonstrates the factual examples of politically motivated fabrication of historical facts by using several representative historical works from contemporary China. Throughout this research, we see that whenever the Chinese historians, who are also revolutionary historians, wrote about this period of history, they did not have reliable textual sources at their hands. Therefore, they could only rely on rumors about Yalta Agreement. However, the Mongols have a different experiences. By analyzing the speech of Marshal Choibalsan, we can find the difference and a gap between the Chinese and the Mongolian understanding of whether or not the Inner Mongolia is China's territory.

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1. The Yalta Agreement of 1945 and the Problem of Inner Mongolia

In August 1945, the Japanese Army withdrew from Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo. On the 9th of September, the “Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People’s Republic” was established in the mid-west of Inner Mongolia, formerly called the “Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region” under Japanese military rule. In Manchukuo, the Mongols also established two autonomous governments, one in Wang-un Sume (Wangyemiao 王爺廟) and the other in Hulunbuir. Three independent regions run by Mongols coexisted around that time, each with a government and army of its own. While they fought against Chinese military (by Eight Road Army (Balujun 八路軍) and the New Fourth Army(Xinsijun 新四軍)), they sent their political missions to the Mongolian People’s Republic, aiming at the national unification and integration of all Mongols. The Mongolian People’s Republic was also waging war against Manchukuo and Japan, advancing their troops in cooperation with the army of the USSR. In those days, unification and integration were the ultimate goal for absolute majority of Mongols.

The Mongolian People’s Republic failed, however, to respond the proposal and request from the Mongols living in Inner Mongolia and former Manchukuo. This was because the three world superpowers, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, had secretly concluded the Yalta Conference Agreement of February 1945 among themselves, and had already decided how they would deal with post-war geopolitics [Wang 2003, p. 71; Borjigin 2011, p. 97–101].

The meeting was held in Yalta, Crimea Peninsula, on February 4–11, 1945, and no Mongol was invited. In their absence, it was decided that the Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) would retain its status quo. This meant that the Mongolian territory would be divided, one part being influenced by the USSR and the other directly ruled by China. As a result of this political separation, Mongols suffered difficult experience similar to the German and Korean peoples. When the Cold War ended, German unification was accomplished. Recently, there has been increasing momentum to further bilateral talks between North and South Korea. By contrast, however, the Mongols have been

left out of this global trend towards ethnic unification and integration, a political legacy of the Post-war era.

The Mongols were well aware of having been placed under colonial rule in the 20th Century [Yang 2013a, p. 43–46, 2013b, p. 173–176]. It was, in fact, a dual colonialism, because they were ruled by both the Chinese and the Japanese. As a result of the Yalta Agreement, Japan, one of the colonial powers, was expelled from the territory of Inner Mongolia. There was, however, another colonial power, that is, China. China occupied¹ the Inner Mongolia territory, proclaiming it their “Autonomous Region” thus legitimizing their presence in the territory to rule the Mongols. This resulted from the "five races of China" concept invented by Han without participation of Mongols and supported formally by world great powers for their political and economic expediencies.

During the Japanese military aggression in China, Marshal Kh. Choibalsan, the supreme leader of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) allied with the Soviet Army, advancing military forces to the southern Mongolian Plateau as well as Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo. His aim was to unite all Mongols under one national identity, thus achieving unification. However, the problem was that I.V. Stalin had not informed him of any of the contents of the Yalta Agreement, although he was supposed to be Choibalsan’s “sworn ally” [Bat-Ochir 2010; Dashidavaa et al. 2010; Choibalsan 2017].

While no Mongol participated in the Yalta Conference, they cannot accept that their national interest was infringed by the then world superpowers, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom as well as China, which has been increasing its geopolitical power in modern times. Since the pre-modern era, many ethnic=national groups in the world have been inspired by nationalism, establishing their own nation states. In Asia, the Mongols were the people who had been aware of their national identity since before the Ottoman Turks [Onon 1989]. During the post-war days, most Asian national groups aimed at liberating themselves from rule by Western superpowers and achieving independence. By contrast, the Mongols regarded Russia, one of the superpowers, as their ally. They aimed at independence from the Qing

¹ After collapse of the Qing Empire the Han proclaimed their nation state, the Republic of China. Mongols also proclaimed their nation state which included Inner and Outer Mongolia. However, Han nationalists invented the doctrine of the "republic of five races" for their claims for non-Chinese lands which before were parts of Qing empire, including Mongolia. That was a political base of Chinese occupation of Mongol lands of Inner Mongolia.

Empire and then from China. For this ultimate goal, the Mongols dared to solicit support from Japan, a newly emerging military power. In the aftermath of World War II, however, the Mongols had lost a half of their land to China. They failed to achieve their goal of building of the united national state, and today a considerable part of Mongols is still being ruled by the Chinese, which easily could be considered as colonial rule. It should be noted, however, that, leading up to the end of WWII, the Chinese were liberated from Japanese colonial rule, because they were helped by their allies, that are, the USSR and the MPR.

China occupied Inner Mongolia, i.e. the southern half of Mongolia. When WWII ended, they had to justify and legitimize this. What reasoning did they use for this justification? How and when did China started to convince the Mongols of the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Mongolia? A movement seeking the national integration of all Mongols had been launched long before the end of WWII. How and when that ethnic initiative of the Mongols was falsified and inserted into the history of the Chinese revolution?

This aims at shedding light on the interpretation of the Mongolian ethnic movement in the context of widely accepted scenarios of the Chinese revolution. How has Stalin and Choibalsang's "rationale" to give Inner Mongolia to China been exploited by Chinese propaganda? For this analysis, this paper focuses on the interactions between the MPR and political missions sent to Ulaanbaatar by the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in their efforts to achieve unification.

It is well-known that China often reinterprets "history" and advocates that a certain area is her territory since ancient times [Kuzmin, Dmitriev 2015, p. 78–86]. We suppose that these claims have caused national (ethnic) problems today. So, can the interpretation of modern history be busy with China? My paper will prompt readers that China provides insufficient evidence.

Let me introduce the study of Communist China, because this reflects the historical view of China today. In other words, China believes that Inner Mongolia is its "own inherent territory" and is the right to defeat the country after the Second World War. So, is the evidence for this statement reliable? Where is the "evidence"? Do China's studies have any differences with the experience of the 1945?

2. Chinese History of the Revolution without Corroboration of Historical Materials

In 1978, shortly after the end of the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the *“History of the Inner Mongolian Revolution”* (*Neimenggu gemingshi* 內蒙古革命史) was published in the People's Republic of China (PRC). While this book refers to the establishment of the “Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People’s Republic”, which took place in Sunid Right Banner, Shilingol League, in September 1945, there is no mention at all of the fact that this Temporary Government sent a political mission to Ulaanbaatar. In those days Outer Mongolia was led by Marshal Choibalsan. This book states that it was Ulaanhu, a Mongol and prominent politician inside the Communist Party of China (CPC), who led military campaign in Inner Mongolia, which disbanded the Temporary Government of Inner Mongolia. The following is an extract from this book [*Neimenggu gemingshi*... 1978, p. 151]:

"In September 1945, some Mongols, members of the counter-revolutionary privileged social class, organised a political gathering called the “Conference of People’s Deputies of Inner Mongolia”. The venue was Sunid Right Banner, Shilingol League. This political rally marked itself as the launching of what they claimed to be the so-called “Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian Republic”. Boyindalai [Bayandalai], a treacherous reactionary Mongol, was elected President. Those in the leading posts of the “Government” were counter-revolutionary reactionary traitors coming from the upper class. They were supporters of feudalism. In order to root out the anti-revolutionary conspiracy, Ulaanhu, the great comrade and leader, advanced his military forces to Sunid Right Banner. He was committed to true Mongolian autonomy. He exposed the reactionary elements of the “Temporary Government”, disclosing counter-revolutionary crimes committed by Bayandalai. He taught the Mongolian youth to follow the right path towards ethnic liberation. People who had been deceived by the “Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian Republic”, were alerted to the truth. They united under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). As a result, the reactionary members of the “Temporary Government” were isolated and expelled. The “Temporary Government” was eventually disbanded".

The rise and fall of the “Temporary Government” described in the *“History of Revolution of Inner Mongolia”* is abstract, lacking particular details. There is no mention in this book of the political envoys sent by the “Temporary Government” to Ulaanbaatar. Their meeting with Marshal Choibalsan is completely ignored in the book.

It is interestingly enough, however, that some changes took place in 1989 in writings about the Inner Mongolian missions to Outer Mongolia. One example is to be found in a book written by Qian Linbao entitled "*The Inner Mongolian Cavalry at the End of the Liberation War*" [Qian 1989, p. 5]:

"In the "Temporary Government of the Pseudo-People's Inner Mongolian Republic", Boyindalai was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He and other high-ranking government officials coming from the upper social class launched a movement for the alleged Mongol liberation. This was after the devils of the Japanese army had been expelled from China. On the 9th of September 1945, they declared the establishment of the "Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People's Republic" at the Toghotu Temple in Sonid Right Banner. This was an outrageous misuse of the passion and dedication of Mongolian youth, who aspired to ethnic liberation. The "Government" sent out a mission to the Mongolian People's Republic to seek alliance, asking for financial support as well as weapons and ammunition, so that they could modernise the military capabilities of 5 divisions they had. Their request was turned down. The political leaders of Ulaanbaatar emphasised that the issues of Inner Mongolia were to be dealt with by the Chinese government as a domestic matter, and advised that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia should liaise with the CPC for cooperation".

Unlike previous writings, Qian Linbao's book referred to the political envoys dispatched by the Mongols of Inner Mongolia to the MPR. Not so many details are given, however. For example, the names of the political leaders of the MPR, who turned down the proposal of alliance from the Temporary Government, are missing. Political processes inside the government of Ulaanbaatar which led to the rejection of the Inner Mongolians' proposal are not described, either. Furthermore, there is no mention at all in Qian Linbao's book of another mission sent to Ulaanbaatar around the same time by the "People's Autonomous Government of East Mongolia". This government was headquartered in Wang-un Sume of the former Manchukuo territory.

Many details of this East Mongolian mission are presented in the paper entitled "*The Mongolian National Movement in Inner Mongolia during the Liberation War*" written by Zhao Min in 1993. The following is an extract [Zhao 1993, p. 185]:

"On the 18th of August 1945, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party launched a major political campaign, aiming at the "Unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia". They collected supporters' signatures for a petition. The Party sent out the "East Mongolian Mission", headed by Boyinmandahu, to the Mongolian People's Republic, asking for their endorsement of the unification. The Mongolian People's Republic turned down the proposal, however...

Another political rally was held in Solung Banner of Hulunbuir on the 22nd of August. Hosting that conference was a good will mission from the Mongolian People's Republic chaired by Hamsureng. A resolution was adopted, declaring that "the Hulunbuir region would accede to the Mongolian People's Republic". Mongols over 18 years of age were qualified to sign the petition, requesting the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. The Autonomous Hulunbuir Government sent special envoys to Ulaanbaatar on the 23rd of August including 7 prominent political leaders such as Shanjimitub and Gonggurjab. They were accompanied by Hamsureng during the journey. However, when they arrived at their destination, their proposal of accession was rejected by the government of the Mongolian People's Republic".

Hamsuren was Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the ruling party of the MPR. As a matter of fact, the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (IMPRP) was founded in October 1925 with the support of the ruling party of the MPR. It is important to understand that the Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department of the ruling party of MPR openly supported the political campaign for the accession of Hulunbuir to his country. It is suspected that, around that time, the political leaders of Ulaanbaatar might have been not yet aware of the contents of the Yalta Agreement.

Zhao Min continues [Zhao 1993, p. 188–189]:

"Boyindalai, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Pseudo-People's Republic of Inner Mongolia, established the "Temporary People's Committee of Inner Mongolia". He took the post of chair of the Committee. The Committee started a political campaign to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia. They had obtained an endorsement for this undertaking from the Allied Military Forces of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. A representative mission,

headed by three political leaders including Delgerchogtu, leader of the “Mongolian Youth Revolutionary Party”, His Royal Highness Mongol Prince (Jasag) Dugharsureng of Sonid Right Banner and Sevendamba, was sent to Ulaanbaatar. However, their proposal of ethnic unification was rejected by the Outer Mongolian government. <...> As a follow-up action, the “Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People’s Republic” under Boyindalai’s leadership dispatched another mission to the Mongolian People’s Republic on the 18th of September. This time, the six-member mission was headed by Damrinsureng, Deputy President of the Temporary Government. Their aim was to have the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic to endorse the independence of their nation state. They were going to request for the political, economic and military assistance for the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. They hoped to announce the independence of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar to gain the attention of the international community. Dashing their hopes, however, the Mongolian People’s Republic refused to accept the proposal, maintaining that Inner Mongolian issues were Chinese domestic matters, which were to be resolved through discussions with the CPC”.

All these writings emphasize that multiple Mongolian missions were sent to Outer Mongolia, seeking ethnic unification, and that they were instructed by Ulaanbaatar to “liaise with the Communist Party of China (CPC)”.

In subsequent years, other books in the PRC were published. One was “*Works in Inner Mongolia Remembered*” written by Liu Chun in 1997 [Liu 1997, p. 409]. Another was published in the same year with the title “*The History of Revolution in Inner Mongolia*”. Its author was Hao Weimin [Hao 1997, p. 456]. In 1998, Wang Duo edited and published a book titled “*A Modern Concise History of Inner Mongolia*” [Wang 1998, p. 28]. All these works emphasize two points. One is that “the proposal to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia was denied by the Mongolian People’s Republic”. The other is that “the Mongols were instructed to communicate with the CPC”. In other words, these two notions represent the Chinese Government’s official view concerning the history of Inner Mongolia. Liu Chun was a Chinese politician, highly regarded as a prominent theorist of ethnic issues in China. He writes: “Boyindalai, founder of the Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People’s Republic, cooperated with the Japanese military during WWII. They sent missions to the Mongolian People’s

Republic because of their hostility to the Chinese. They attempted to escape from Chinese sanctions by getting support from Outer Mongolia. It was completely legitimate that Ulaanbaatar rejected their proposal, expelling the missions from their country.” Liu Chun criticizes Mongols as “ethnic separatists, who cooperated with Japan during WW II”. He accuses the Inner Mongolian ethnic movement of being an attempt to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia and thus a “betrayal of China”. With that reasoning, he commends the actions of the MPR to “expel” Bayindalai’s mission from their country, despite the fact that they were also ethnically Mongols.

I have described the official Chinese historical view in relation to the Mongols’ political campaign to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia, as well as to Ulaanbaatar’s reactions to the Inner Mongolian missions. Even after the collapse of the USSR, there has been no major change in this historical interpretation.

In 2010, Hao Weimin published a paper in which he commended Ulaanhu, a Mongol and prominent politician inside the CPC. It is suggested in his writing that Ulaanhu committed himself more to ethnic autonomy within the Chinese polity than to the ethnic unification of all Mongols. Hao Weimin introduced a subtle modification of the description of the “refusal” by the MPR, rejecting the proposal of unification. The author writes in his paper that “the Government of the Mongolian People’s Republic explained that they could not support the independence of Inner Mongolia” and that “they had also advised that the political parties of Inner Mongolia cooperate with the CPC” [Hao 2010, p. 275]. What is worth noting in this writing is, firstly, that Ulaanbaatar clearly stated that they would not support the independence of Inner Mongolia, and secondly, that they recommended that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia would “cooperate” with the CPC. Contrary to that recommendation, after the establishment of the PRC, the CPC disbanded the political parties of Inner Mongolia. They accused the Mongols of Inner Mongolia saying that “they had cooperated with the Japanese military during WWII”, and that “in the post-war period, they pursued unity with Outer Mongolia, perpetrating ethnic separatists crimes”. The Chinese Government arrested 346,000 people, among whom 27,900 were murdered [Hao 1991, p. 313–314]. Ethnic autonomy of Mongols from the beginning existed almost exclusively on paper. It seems that Hao Weimin maintains that the reason of tragic events in the history of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia was their accession to the Autonomous Region.

3. People's Memories and Historical Truth

None of the aforementioned books or papers reveals any sources to corroborate what is written. There is no mention of official archives, which could support the notion that Ulaanbaatar “refused” to accept the proposal of Inner Mongolia. Some writings contain an extract from the report dated by the October 27, 1945. This report was prepared by the intelligence section of the CPC and titled “*Report of Current Situation of Various Banners of Chahar League and Actions Taken in Chahar and Shilingol Leagues*”. The name of the writer of this report is unknown. The following is an extract from this secret report submitted by the intelligence section [*Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhanbu* 1991, p. 967]:

"Six members of the mission, who came back to Inner Mongolia on the 20th of October, reported a message from the government of the Mongolian People's Republic. According to them, the political leaders of Outer Mongolia said: “Due to the current international diplomatic situation, the Government of Outer Mongolia can no longer support the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, helping their political campaign to withdraw from Chinese rule and establish an independent nation state. We advise the political parties of Inner Mongolia to cooperate with the CPC, thereby achieving ethnic liberation under the leadership of the CPC”.

This is how the anonymous reporter describes what he was told about the outcome of the mission after its return home. The report does not disclose the source of this information.

There is significant discrepancy between the written history of revolution compiled by the Chinese authorities and what Mongols themselves remember. I myself met a Mongol man in the Huhhot on September 9, 2002. His name is Sodnamdarjai, and he was 75 years old, when I met him. His father's name was Mugdenbuu, and he was one of the six envoys sent to Ulaanbaatar by the Temporary Government of the Inner Mongolian People's Republic. The following is Sodnamdarjai's testimony concerning what his father said about his trip to Outer Mongolia [Yang 2018, p. 91–94]:

"When we arrived at Ulaanbaatar, we (the members of the mission) were treated courteously with warm hospitality. Each of us was given copies of the works of Marx and Lenin. When it became colder, we were provided with overcoats. One evening in mid-October, we were invited to a banquet hosted by Marshal Choibalsan. His Excellency

Ambassador “Nikolaev”², then USSR ambassador to the Mongolian People’s Republic, was also among the guests. During the evening, Marshal Choibalsan addressed us as follows: “Since I am a Mongol, I never intend to squeeze you out from any discussion concerning Inner Mongolian issues. At the same time, however, I cannot ignore the way in which diplomatic relations have been evolving in the international community. I have been told that, based on the Yalta Agreement, Wang Shijie (王世傑), Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Moscow, where he met Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and the ambassador of Outer Mongolia to the USSR. I have been informed that Wang Shijie told those two politicians firstly, that a referendum would be held to decide whether Outer Mongolia would become independent or not, and secondly, that the national border between Outer Mongolia and China would be drawn along the demarcation line between Inner and Outer Mongolia”. As soon as this comment was made, the cheerful atmosphere vanished. Things suddenly became gloomy in the room. I (Sodnamdarjai) would like to emphasise an important point here. We have been taught that Marshal Choibalsan said to the members of the Inner Mongolian mission at that banquet: “Please return home and continue the revolutionary movement in collaboration with the CPC”. In all school textbooks and history books published in the People’s Republic of China, these “words” of Marshal Choibalsan have been overly emphasised and exploited for political propaganda. My father often talked about that banquet to me. According to him, Marshal Choibalsan never articulated such words. In fact, Marshal Choibalsan hated China. He had a strong belief that, unless the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, people of his brotherhood, were liberated from Chinese colonial rule, the Mongols could never achieve ethnic self-determination”.

Sodnamdarjai's testimony about his father's journey to Ulaanbaatar provides me and other Mongols with a clear answer to an important question, which we have continued to ask for many years. It is true that even today many Mongols are still suspicious of the Chinese official view of the Mongolian history. The suspicion is centred on the “words of rejection”, which, according to the official view, were addressed by Marshal Choibalsan to the Inner Mongolian envoys. He said: “Please return home and continue the revolutionary movement in

² These are the memories of the Sodnamdarjai. Correctly, it should be I. A. Ivanov.

cooperation with the CPC". It is well-known that Marshal Choibalsan upheld Mongol unification as the most important mission for him, dedicating himself to the ideal of accomplishing ethnic self-determination for all Mongols. In the February of 1946 Choibalsan had a meeting with Stalin, and received his consent for propagandizing the idea of independence within the Inner Mongolia and Khingan region.

What attitude does Choibalsan hold? We can read his own work first. On August 24, 1945, Choibalsan addressed Ulaanbaatar's workers, saying that "we had liberated the Inner Mongolian Mongols and Bargha Mongols from Japanese rule in order to make them independent" [Choibalsan 1953, p. 436–437]. Scholars from Mongolia and Japan, who have used the recently-decoded archives, also point out that Choibalsan has emphasized the identity of Inner and Outer Mongolia in the summer and fall of 1945 [Bat-Ochir 2010, p. 101–113; Borjigin 2011, p. 104–106]³.

His mission was hindered by Stalin, however. It is said that relations between Stalin and Marshal Choibalsan soured intensely. What is the truth of the historical background, against which Mongols were divided between Inner and Outer Mongolia? I will probably continue to ask this question, seeking an answer for many years to come.

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³ During this thesis review, Dr. Kuzmin told me the following academic information. In the August 1945, a governmental delegation from the MPR visited Inner Mongolia. With regard to the national liberation movement there, the delegation head B. Lamjav said: "We liberated you from Japan. The most important for you is obtaining of liberty, to be liberated from foreign suppression, to protect your nation... All these cannot be granted to you by any foreign state or by any foreign people. You must rise up yourself, using your will and your efforts, to work by yourself. What country to rely on, what power to create, from whom and what to ask — this is your business" [Batbayar 2002, p. 199]. This study indirectly indicates that the MPR leader Choibalsan, by the head of his delegation to Inner Mongolia, has not called on the Inner Mongols to work with the CPC too. Thanks to Dr. Kuzmin and other reviewers.

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Чойбалсан и Внутренняя Монголия: что сказал маршал Чойбалсан политической миссии из Внутренней Монголии?

АННОТАЦИЯ: Почему сегодня Внутренняя Монголия — национальный автономный район (*миньцзу цзычжицзюй*) Китая? Другими словами, когда Внутренняя Монголия стала частью территории Китая? Сами монголы не видят разницы между "внутренними" и "внешними" монголами и чуть менее века назад в стремлении достигнуть национального единства и независимости от Китая они рассчитывали на Россию и Японию как на силы, потенциально способные содействовать осуществлению этих целей. Тем не менее Внутренняя Монголия была передана Китаю Соединенными Штатами, Великобританией и Советским Союзом в соответствии с Ялтинскими соглашениями, тайно подписанными в феврале 1945 г. После окончания Второй мировой войны монголы продолжили бороться за политическое объединение. О чем же они вели переговоры? Чем отличается монгольский исторический опыт от китайских записей? И какими представлял эти события Китай в процессе написания истории собственной революции? В данной статье демонстрируются конкретные случаи фабрикации исторических фактов на примере нескольких репрезентативных исторических работ, вышедших в современном Китае. В ходе исследования мы можем обнаружить, что когда бы китайские историки, которые в то же время являются историками революции, ни описывали данный период, они не имели на руках каких-либо надёжных текстовых источников и, таким образом, могли ориентироваться лишь на слухи о Ялтинских соглашениях. Монгольский опыт, однако, иной. Проанализировав речь маршала Чойбалсана, мы можем обнаружить различия в представлениях китайцев и монголов о том, является ли Внутренняя Монголия частью территории Китая.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: Внутренняя Монголия; Х. Чойбалсан, Коммунистическая партия Китая (КПК), Монгольская Народная Республика (МНР), Улаанху

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